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Abstract
Major currency areas are characterized by important diﬀerences in ﬁnancial structure that
are clear in microeconomic data. Surprisingly, this fact is seldom discussed in the analysis of
the international transmission of shocks. This paper attempts to ﬁll this gap. First, I examine
some stylized facts about ﬁnancial diversity and cyclical correlations among OECD countries.
Data show a negative relation between cyclical correlations and diﬀerences in ﬁnancial sys-
tems. Second, using a two-country model with sticky prices, imperfect ﬁnancial integration and
borrowing constraints on investment, calibrated to US and euro area data, I analyze the inter-
national transmission of shocks with diﬀerent degrees of ﬁnancial fragility in the two economies.
I ﬁnd, ﬁrst, that ﬁnancial diversity can account for heterogenous business cycle ﬂuctuations and
reproduce the negative relation found in the data. Diﬀerential responses to shocks are shown
to occur with independent monetary policies - Taylor rules or rigid inﬂation targets -. The
result is robust under diﬀerent degrees of economic and ﬁnancial openness and of correlation
of underlying shocks. Credible pegs help to increase synchronization of cycles. The model is
successful in accounting for some international business cycle facts, like the output correlations
puzzle.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: E3, E42, E44, E52, F41.
Keywords: ﬁnancial diversity, monetary regimes, diﬀerential transmission mechanism, inter-
national business cycle.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Diﬀerent countries and currency areas are typically characterized by diﬀerent ﬁnancial structures,
as a result of history, legal frameworks, collective preferences, politics1. Financial structures are in
turn among the key determinants of bank and asset risks. Micro data2 for industrialized country
show diﬀerences in banking systems in terms of return on assets, loan loss provisions, availability of
external ﬁnance and eﬃciency indicators. At the same time, remarkable asymmetries in economic
ﬂuctuations have been documented across industrialized countries mostly during the last decade.
For instance some countries like the UK and the US have highly correlated business cycle ﬂuctua-
tions, while other regions like the US, the Euro area and Asian countries are characterized by low
or negative correlations over the cycle.
Financial markets may play a role in shaping the patterns of international transmission of
shocks across countries3. However, asymmetries in the ﬁnancial systems and corporate risk have
not been incorporated in the analysis of the international transmission of shocks and of macro policy
interdependence. The open economy literature has studied international business cycle properties
under diﬀerent settings, but very little work has focused on the role of ﬁnancial fragility and even
less on the eﬀect of asymmetries in such fragility. This paper explores this concept and argues
that ﬁnancial diversity can account for heterogenous business cycle ﬂuctuations and help to explain
some of the features of the international transmission mechanism across countries.
To this aim I, ﬁrst, present evidence of the presence of diﬀerences in ﬁnancial markets and for
the fact that they account for asymmetries over the business cycle. Data show that a negative and
signiﬁcant relation exists between the correlation of output gaps and ﬁnancial gaps, deﬁned as the
diﬀerence between indicators of banking eﬃciency. Secondly, I examine an artiﬁcial economy with
two countries characterized by diﬀerent degree of ﬁnancial fragility and identical policies that allows
me to isolate the eﬀect of ﬁnancial diﬀerences over the business cycle. In an otherwise standard two
country model of stochastic dynamic general equilibrium with optimizing agents4 characterized by
nominal rigidities in an imperfectly competitive framework and incomplete international markets
for bonds, I introduce agents’ heterogeneity, borrowing constraints on investment and ﬁnancial
1La Porta, Lopes-de Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny (1997), (1998), La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer (1999), Pagano
and Volpin (2000).
2See dataset Bankscope from IBCA Fitch and OCSE Bank Proﬁtability Report.
3This aspects is stressed, for example, in the latest IMF World Economic Outlook: “Several observations hint at
the role that structural factors and policy regimes play in determining the strength of the international business cycle
linkages.... Co-movements in output gaps in United States, Canada and United Kingdom remained positive during
t h ee n t i r e1 9 9 0 ’ s . . . T h ec l o s ea ﬃliation in the business cycle of the United Kingdom with that of the United States,
despite much more important trade links with Euro area countries may have been the result of strong ﬁnancial market
linkages..... Asymmetries in business cycles ﬂuctuations across industrialized countries are likely to reﬂect diﬀerences
in country sizes and ﬁnancial depth”; IMF (2001), chapter 2.
4Many contributions are in the area of the New Open Economy whose aim is to build up a new generation of open
economy models relying on stochastic general equilibrium frameworks with microfoundations -i.e. see Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ (1985).
2diversity. Sticky prices are introduced for two reasons. First, they allow for a meaningful comparison
with the existing literature in the new open economy. Secondly, they are essential when studying
endogenous monetary policy or comparing diﬀerent monetary policy regimes as it is in this case.
Borrowing constraints on investment are due to the presence of asymmetric information between
borrowers and lenders5. Financial diﬀerences are modelled in terms of cost of bankruptcy, riskiness
of investment projects and failure probability of ﬁrms. These elements are in turn determinants of
t h er e t u r no na s s e t ,t h es i z eo ft h el o a nl o s s ,t h es i z eo ft h eb o r r o w i n gl i m i ta n di t se l a s t i c i t yw i t h
respect to collateral. The sensitivity of the borrowing limit to the conditions of collateral is the
key determinant of the link between ﬁnancial fragility and business cycle. More precisely, higher
sensitivity leads to more volatile and persistent business cycles.
The model is calibrated on the US and the Euro area, for two reasons. First, the macroe-
conomic and policy interactions between these two areas have become, after the creation of the
euro in 1999, the key issue in international economics6. Second, the asymmetries in the ﬁnancial
structure between these areas are well documented, and have often been advocated to explain the
diﬀerences in the domestic transmission mechanism of monetary policy7.
I ﬁnd that diﬀerential responses occur under identical and independent policies and for diﬀerent
degrees of economic and ﬁnancial openness. The correlations of output decrease when ﬁnancial
diﬀerences among countries increase. This result is robust to diﬀerent parametrization and holds
for any value of correlation of the underlying shocks. The negative relation found in the model
recalls the one in the data.
The intuition for this result in the model is linked to the role of ﬁnancial asymmetries. Having
diﬀerent degrees of borrowing constraints generates diﬀerent degrees of persistence and volatilities
for the responses of variables even with symmetric and correlated shocks.
To better understand the transmission mechanism of the model I start from analyzing the
case of asymmetric shocks and symmetric ﬁnancial systems. When a positive technology shock
hits the home country the demand shift between domestic and foreign goods induces a decrease in
foreign inﬂation. The endogenous response of the foreign monetary policy reduces interest rates.
As a result, the foreign economy experiences a fall in the cost of loans that boosts investment,
asset prices 8 and employment in the foreign country. In addition the improvement in collateral
5Borrowing constraints on investment have been extensively explored in the closed economy literature. They
generally lead to higher volatility and persistence of output, investment and asset prices. Among others see Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1998), Cooley and Nam (1998), Kiyotaki and Moore (1998), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998).
6A main contribution in the study of the international transmission mechanism between US and Europe is Chari,
Kehoe and McGrattan (2000).
7Cecchetti and al. (1999) provide an empirical study of the presence of asymmetries inside US, Europe and
between the two areas as whole.
8The new open economy literature does not provide explanation of the link between total factor productivity shocks
in the US and asset prices in Europe. This link is well documented and examined in other areas of macroeconomics:
see for example Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999). This paper’s model is able to account for this fact.
3conditions and the ease in the borrowing limit exacerbate the increase in investment, thereby
raising output. The positive ﬁnancial eﬀect can partly or completely oﬀset the negative impact of
the demand shift on the foreign country business cycle. The magnitude of this indirect ﬁnancial
spillover w i l ld e p e n do nb o t ht h er e l a t i v ed e g r e eo fﬁnancial diﬀerences between the two countries
and the business cycle sensitivity of the foreign country. Whenever the two countries have similar
ﬁnancial systems the positive ﬁnancial spillover is able to oﬀset the negative switching expenditure
eﬀect hence generating positive output correlations. In this respect the model is successful in
matching international business cycle facts. In fact traditional models of international business
cycle are plagued by a discrepancy between the correlations of output, employment and investment
- i.e. always negative in the model - and the ones in the data - i.e. mostly positive9. The channels
responsible for the negative correlations in those models are given by the following two eﬀects.
The ﬁrst eﬀect - i.e. known as switching expenditure eﬀect - occurs because a positive productivity
shock in home country, by reducing domestic inﬂation, generates a demand shift unfavorable to the
foreign country. The second eﬀect is due to the ﬂows of capital toward the country that beneﬁts of
the technology improvement. Even when adjustment costs are introduced to dampen the second
eﬀect, negative output correlations might still persist due to the switching expenditure eﬀect. The
present model is able to overturn the correlations under reasonable degrees of ﬁnancial similarity
since it is enriched with an “indirect ﬁnancial spillover”e ﬀect10.
When moving to the case of countries with diﬀerent ﬁnancial systems the model is able to
reproduce, under both technology and monetary policy, a wide range of output cross-correlation
values that are monotonically decreasing with respect to the degree of diﬀerence between ﬁnancial
systems. This happens independently of the correlation values for the underlying shocks11.T h e
main channel responsible for the result has to be found in the diﬀerential business cycle sensitivity
generated by the credit channel. In fact, I also ﬁnd that the diﬀerence in volatilities between the
countries is an increasing function of the ﬁnancial diﬀerences. This is due to the fact that diﬀerent
elasticities of credit availability to collateral conditions produce diﬀerent degrees of business cycle
responsiveness.
In order to check the robustness of the results I provide several experiments by allowing for
diﬀerent monetary rules - i.e. Taylor rules versus rigid inﬂation targeting and credible pegs-, for
diﬀerent degrees of economic openness - i.e. as calibrated by the steady state balance trade ratio
of exports over GDP - and ﬁnancial openness - as parametrized by the ratio of foreign currency
denominated loans over total loans. Under all the experiments business cycle correlations decrease
9See Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992), Baxter and Crucini (1995) and Stockman and Tesar (1995).
10Heathcote and Perri (2002a) made advances in this respect, though their results are obtained under the extreme
assumption of ﬁnancial autarchy.
11Heathcote and Perri (2002b) provide an alternative explanation for asymmetric cycles. They show that an
increase in ﬁnancial globalization reduces business cycle synchronization. Although ﬁnancial globalization in their
model is endogenously determined by the correlation of the underlying shocks.
4signiﬁcantly when ﬁnancial diﬀerences increase. The only exception is found in the case of credible
pegs that helps cycle synchronization by increasing the absolute values of output correlation and
reducing the steepness of its relation with the ﬁnancial gap.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some statistical evidence, documenting
t h ep r e s e n c eo fd i ﬀerences in ﬁnancial markets and their link with asymmetries over the business
cycle. Section 3 and 4 present the model economy. Section 5 shows calibration. Sections 6 and
7 present the results. Conclusion, tables, graphs and appendices are reported at the end of the
paper.
2 E v i d e n c eF o rT h eP r e s e n c ea n dT h eE ﬀect of Heterogenous
Financial Markets
Extensive evidence exists in the international business cycles literature showing that the extent of
bilateral trade is not the sole - e.g. and not even the most important - determinant of business cycle
co-movements12. Some attempts have been done to look for other sources of international trans-
mission rather than trade. Some authors show that either multi-sector models with intermediate
good trade13 or that variable capital utilization and factor hoarding14 can improve the performance
of the models by generating correlations of output, employment and investment that are closer to
the ones in the data. Others stress the importance of the business cycle diversity across countries15
and argue that geography is a better candidate - i.e. rather than trade or shock transmission - for
explaining proximity in ﬂuctuations16.
Recently several authors are exploring the role of ﬁnancial factors and institutions. Most of
the literature has concentrated on the eﬀects of ﬁnancial openness or foreign direct investment on
cross-correlations17 and a few have looked at institutions18.T h ee ﬀects of ﬁnancial diversity have
recently been explored in the context of currency areas19.
The purpose of this section is to show that ﬁnancial diversity can be classiﬁed among the
sources of international business cycle co-movements. First, I report various stylized facts for
industrialized countries that characterize both the proﬁle of ﬁnancial market institutions and the
12Among others see Canova and Dellas (1993), Baxter (1995), Schmitt-Grohe (1998), Imbs (1999), Ambler, Cardia
and Zimmerman (2002).
13Ambler, Cardia and Zimmerman (1998).
14Baxter and Farr (2001).
15See data surveys from Dellas (1986), Cantor and Mark (1987,1988), Canova and Dellas (1990), Gerlach (1988)
and Head (1995).
16See Zimmerman (1995). See Rey and Portes (2001) for the eﬀects of ﬁnancial distance.
17See Mendoza and Calvo (2000), Mendoza (2001), Heathcote and Perri (2002b), Hoﬀman (2000), Imbs (2002).
18Artis and Zhang (1996) show the link between proximity in institutional agreements and conformity in business
cycle. Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) show the link between institutions and income levels across countries.
19Several authors have argued that the euro area monetary transmission mechanism is uneven across euro area
countries. See Cecchetti (2001), Giovannetti and Marimon (2000) and Mihov (2001).
5international business cycle. Secondly, a relation is shown to exist between micro data on ﬁnancial
diﬀerences and macro data on international business cycle correlations. The micro data will also be
used to calibrate the parameters that in the model characterize the banking and ﬁnancial system.
Micro data for ﬁnancial markets and banking industry. Financial systems can be
mainly characterized by bank health and asset risk. A more fragile system is indeed associated with
lower bank eﬃciency and higher asset risk and as a consequence with higher borrowing constraints
on investment. The following data stress heterogeneities in the degree of borrowing constraints, in
bank structure and riskiness of investment.
Table 3 shows data for corporate debt securities for the main currency areas20.I ti sa l r e a d y
evident that borrowing constraints are tighter in the Euro area and Japan with respect to US and
UK. Even though the Euro area and US are very similar in terms of population and economic
activity, the markets for loans are much thinner in European countries.
A close look at the data for the credit industry and the riskiness of investment projects reveal
more speciﬁc dissimilarities across the countries. Table 421 shows data on return of assets - i.e.
return on investment projects for banks - and loan loss provisions as percentage of total bank
liabilities, on external ﬁnance as percentage of GDP and on the Thomson rating. The Thomson
rating is an indicator of bank health. A lower value for this statistic identiﬁes a more eﬃcient
banking system. Data are shown for EMU countries, the Euro area as a whole, the UK, the US and
Japan. First notice that there are many similarities between the American and British banking
systems, while more pronounced diﬀerences emerge among the three major currency areas. For
i n s t a n c er e t u r n so na s s e t sa r eb i g g e rt h a no n ei nt h eU Sa n dt h eU K ,b u ta r el o w e rt h a no n ef o r
Japan, the Euro area as a whole and the vast majority of European countries. Loan loss provisions
are very low for the US and the UK but are higher for Japan and for the Euro area. Also, availability
of external ﬁnance is much higher for English speaking countries. The Thomson rating assigns the
lowest value - i.e. highest banking eﬃciency - to the US and the highest value to Japan.
In the model I will present later loan loss provisions are used to calibrate bankruptcy costs,
the availability of external ﬁnance is identiﬁed by the borrowing limit and the return on assets
corresponds to the return on investment.
Diﬀerences in business cycles. Along with the documented heterogeneity between ﬁnancial
markets stands some heterogeneity in business cycle ﬂuctuations. Table 5 shows cross-correlations
of output gaps for industrialized countries computed with the approximate bandpass ﬁlter proposed
by Baxter and King (1999)22. The table shows that cross-correlations between U.S. and U.K. are
much higher than the ones between the U.S. and the euro area or Japan. Similarly cross-correlations
20Data are taken from Angeloni, Gaspar, Issing and Tristani (2000).
21These data are draw from S. Cecchetti (1999), “Legal Structure, Financial Structure, and The Monetary Policy
Transmission Mechanism”. The ultimate source of the data are dataset Bankscope from IBCA Fitch and OCSE Bank
Proﬁtability Report. In each country banks were chosen according to 1997 assets.
22Calculations are drawn from the Economic Outlook report of the IMF for the 2001.
6among European countries are higher than the ones among those countries and the U.S. or the U.K..
Notice that this happens despite the fact that U.K. is trading much more with the euro area than
with the U.S..
This relative ranking persists even when ﬁltering data with the Hodrick-Prescottand even when
considering diﬀerent sample periods. The evidence suggests that a link exists between ﬁnancial
diversity and heterogenous business cycles.
In the model presented later a higher bankruptcy cost and riskiness of investments determines
an higher elasticity of the borrowing limit to ﬁnancial conditions. Tighter borrowing constraints
are in turn determinant of higher sensitivity in business cycles.
Empirical relation between ﬁnancial diversity and business cycle asymmetry. A
link exists between asymmetries in the business cycles and ﬁnancial diﬀerences. The measure of the
asymmetries in the business cycle is obtained using cross-correlation in output gaps. Output gap
is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the series for the log of the real GDP and the trend calculated
with the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. The data used for GDP are quarterly data from the 1985 to 2000.
I plot cross-correlations of output gaps over a measure of ﬁnancial gap. The scatter plot and the
regression line in ﬁgure 1 show a negative relation between asymmetries in business cycles and
diﬀerences in ﬁnancial system. The ﬁnancial gap showed here is the average over the 1989-1999 of
the bilateral diﬀerences for the return on assets23. I choose this one for two reasons. First, it is the
o n et h a tm o r ec l o s e l ym i m i ct h eﬁnancial gap measure in the model. Financial gaps in the model
are obtained through diﬀerences in the external ﬁnance premium that determines the returns on
asset. The external ﬁnance premium is in turn determined by bankruptcy costs and availability of
external ﬁnance. The return on asset is then a synthetic measure of the type of frictions introduced
in the model. Secondly, this index is the only one for which the IBCA Bankscope dataset provides
the longest and most regular series. Notice that the relation is robust to the inclusion, singularly
or in the form of weighted averages, of the bilateral diﬀerences of the other indices shown in table
4. In particular the Thomson rating performs as well as the return on asset.
The negative relation persists even when output gaps are calculated using annual data from
the 1960 onward.
Table 6 shows that the relation is signiﬁcant. Table 7 and 8 also show that the relation
is robust to the inclusion of trade and a dummy for language. Trade is not signiﬁcant and does
not aﬀect the signiﬁcance level of the ﬁnancial gap. The dummy variable reduces slightly the
signiﬁcance level of the ﬁnancial gap. The reason for this has to be found in the fact that ﬁnancial
institutions are often similar inside regions sharing the same language.
An important remark is that the regression results are not aﬀected by problems of endogeneity
between business cycle and ﬁnancial diﬀerences. In fact the data used for the ﬁnancial institutions
23Data are obtained by the IBCA Bankscope dataset.
7vary across countries but not across years. This is because they are mainly determined by legal
structures.
3 A Model Economy with Financial Heterogeneity
There are two regions of equal size. Each country is inhabited by a continuum of agents with
measure one. Each economy is symmetric for everything apart from the microfoundations of the
contracting problem between borrowers and lenders. Asset markets are incomplete both, domesti-
cally and internationally.
Each economy is populated by two sets of agents, workers and entrepreneurs. Each agent is
simultaneously consumer, investor and owner of a production sector in the economy. The presence
of heterogeneity is essential in order to model the lender-borrower relationship. Indeed the workers
provide funds to the intermediary who pools resources and supplies loans to the entrepreneurs.
Loans are used by the entrepreneurs to ﬁnance acquisition of physical capital.
There are two diﬀerent units of the production sector. The ﬁr s tu n i ta c t sa sac o m p e t i t i v e
sector that produces a homogenous good using capital and labor. The second unit acts as a
monopolistic competitive sector that produces a diﬀerentiated good using the homogenous good as
an input and sets prices facing Rotemberg adjustment costs.
Let st = {s0,....st} denote the history of events up to date t,w h e r est denotes the event
realization at date t.T h ed a t e0 probability of observing history st is given by ρt. The initial state
s0 is given so that ρ0 =1 . Henceforth, and for the sake of simplifying the notation, let’s deﬁne
the operator Et{.} ≡
P
st+1 ρ(st+1|st) as the mathematical expectations over all possible states of
nature conditional on history st.
3.1 Workers Behavior in Home and Foreign Country
Workers are risk averse and inﬁnite lived. They consume a variety of goods, supply labor and
run the monopolistic production unit. Workers invest in a risk free bond, denominated in foreign
consumption index24. In addition I assume that they invest in deposits since the demand for this
asset comes from the presence of the intermediary25.
Aggregate consumption, C, is an aggregate of domestic and imported goods assembled accord-

















24T h ep r e s e n c eo ft h i sb o n dw i l la l l o wt od e r i v et h eu n c o v e r e di n t e r e s tr a t ep a r i t y .
25The introduction of deposits is redundant from an asset pricing perspective but it is necessary to satisfy market













ε−1 are composite aggregates of
domestic and imported consumption goods respectively. Optimal demand for each variety of the












































βtU (Ct)− V (Nt)
)
(4)
where N denotes total labor hours. U is increasing, concave and diﬀerentiable and V is increasing,
convex and diﬀerentiable. The household receives at the beginning of time t a labor income of
WtNt,w h e r eWt is the nominal wage. In order to ﬁnance consumption at time t she invests in
deposits, Dt, expressed in units of domestic consumption index, that pay RtDt one period later
and one period maturity real bonds, B∗
t , denominated in units of foreign consumption index, that
pays a returns RF
t . The sequence of budget constraints reads as follows:












where Θt are the nominal proﬁts of the domestic monopolistic ﬁrms, whose shares are owned by the




Pt is the real exchange rate. Households choose the set of processes
{Ct,N t,D t,B∗
t }∞
t=0 taking as given the set of processes {Pt,W t,R t,R F
t }∞
t=0 and the initial wealth
D0,B ∗
















Equation (6) is the optimality condition with respect to labor supply. Equations (7) and (8)
give the optimality conditions with respect to deposits and foreign bonds.
Due to imperfect capital mobility and/or in order to capture the existence of country risk
domestic workers pay a spread between the interest rate on the foreign currency portfolio and the
interest rate of the foreign country. This spread is proportional to the (real) value of the country’s








where ζ > 026, ζ0 > 0. In addition I assume that the initial distribution of wealth between the two
countries is symmetric.
Aggregating the budget constraints of the workers and substituting for (9) we obtain the














Nt] − [Dt − Rt−1Dt−1] − Ct (10)
W o r k e r si nt h eF o r e i g nR e g i o n . I assume throughout that all goods are traded, that
both countries face the same composition of consumption bundle and that the law of one price
holds. This implies that PH(i)=eP∗
H(i),P F(i)=eP∗
F(i),P(i)=eP∗(i) for all i ∈ [0,1],w h e r ee is
the nominal exchange rate. Foreign agents face a maximization problem similar to the one of the
domestic agents. However they do not face any additional cost of portfolio allocation so that they
always receive the same interest rate, R∗
t.





























26As shown in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001) and Benigno (2002) this assumption is needed in order to maintain
the stationarity in the model. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001) also show that adding this spread - i.e. whose size has
been shown negligible in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) - does not change signiﬁcantly the behavior of the economy
as compared to the one observed under the complete asset market assumption or under the introduction of other
inducing stationarity elements - see Mendoza (1991), Senhadji (1994), Ghironi (2001) .
10which states that under imperfect ﬁnancial integration marginal utilities are equalized only up to
the level of the country risk.










3.2 The Entrepreneurs in the Home and Foreign Country
The second set of agents are Entrepreneurs. They consume, invest in capital markets and run
production in the competitive unit. In each period they rent to ﬁrms in the competitive unit
the existing capital stock that they own and ﬁnance investment in new capital. To ﬁnance the
purchase of new capital they need to acquire a loan from a competitive intermediary that raises
funds through deposits. The return on capital is subject to an idiosyncratic shock, ωj27.A tt h e
beginning of each period the entrepreneur observes the aggregate shock. Before buying capital,
the entrepreneur goes to the loan markets and borrows money from the intermediary by making
a contract which is written before the idiosyncratic shock is recognized. For the relationship with
the lender is subject to an agency cost problem the Entrepreneur needs to pay an external ﬁnance
premium on the loan. Finally I assume that Entrepreneurs are risk neutral28 and they have a
probability of dying ς29.
Each Entrepreneur chooses a sequence {Ce






t , ςβ ≤ β (13)
subject to the following sequence of constraints:
MPKtKt−1 + Lt + Σt = Ce
t + QtIt + RL
t Lt−1 (14)






Equation (14) is the Entrepreneurs’ budget constraint in units of domestic consumption goods.
Wealth is derived from rental income MPKtKt for production, new loans Lt and a transfer of
wealth, Σt, from old agents. The presence of the transfer Σt assures that aggregate net wealth
are diﬀerent from zero in the steady state, even tough its presence does not play any particular
27Entrepreneurs are heterogenous for two reasons. First they own sectors that are subject to idiosyncratic shocks.
Secondly, being ﬁnite lived, they have diﬀerent accumulation of assets.
28This assumption is required by the speciﬁc form of the contract between lenders and borrowers that is a costly
state veriﬁcation contract.
29In this respect I follow Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998). This assumption assures
that entrepreneurial consumption occurs to such an extent that self-ﬁnancing never occurs and borrowing constraints
on loans are always binding.
11role along the cycle. Expenditure is allocated in ﬁnal good consumption Ce
t , investment It (where
Qt is the real price of new capital) and in the service of the predetermined loan debt RL
t Lt−1.
Constraint (15) indicates that, when investing in capital, entrepreneurs face adjustment costs. The
cost function Φ(·) is convex and satisﬁes Φ(δ)=0and Φ
0




t=0 as the sequence of Lagrange multipliers on the constraints (14) and



































where λt is the lagrange multiplier on constraint (14). Equation (16) simply states that, due to
risk neutrality, the marginal utility of additional real income is constant. Equation (17) is the
Euler eﬃciency condition on the loan holding. Equations (18) and (19) are the eﬃciency conditions
on capital investment. Notice that the lagrange multiplier Qt denotes the real shadow value of
installing new capital and thus plays the role of the implicit price of capital (or asset price).
In order to derive the aggregate consumption function it is worth to notice that the probability
of dying for the entrepreneurs corresponds, by law of large numbers, to the fraction of entrepreneurs
t h a td i ei ne a c hp e r i o d .T h ep o p u l a t i o ni sh e l ds t e a d yb yt h eb i r t ho fan e we n t r e p r e n e u rf o re a c h
dying one. Under those assumption entrepreneurs behave as permanent income consumers since
they consume a constant fraction, ς, of their end of period wealth, NWt :
Ce
t = ς(NWt−1 − Σt) (20)
Loans demand, return on assets and aggregate net wealth accumulation. In the
current period domestic Entrepreneurs need to ﬁnance an investment value QtKt+1.To this end
they employ existing collateral NWt and resort to external funds via a ﬁnancial intermediary. The
amount of capital investment that needs to be ﬁnanced is therefore, in real terms, QtKt − NWt.
12Let’s deﬁne Lt as the total amount borrowed by each entrepreneur against the required capital













as the expected aggregate return on capital investment30.T od e r i v ea n






ς−1. Then substituting the latter and (18) into (19) and imposing arbitrage condition between the























Aggregation in this model is feasible considering that the fraction of entrepreneurs that remains
alive in every period is equal to the constant (1 −ς). To derive aggregate net wealth we substitute
(15), (21) and (22) into (14). After aggregating the net wealth accumulation of the economy reads
as follows:
NWt = ς[Rk
t Qt−1Kt−1 − RL
t (Qt−1Kt−1 − NWt−1) − Σt] (23)
3.3 The Production Sector
The competitive production unit. There is a continuum of ﬁrms indexed by j. Each domestic
entrepreneur owns one of the ﬁrms of the intermediate-goods producing sector. Firms have an
exogenous probability of failure that correspond to the probability of dying for entrepreneurs (ς).









where At is a productivity shifter common to all entrepreneurs. The optimizing decision of labor
and capital is made by solving a static optimization problem for cost minimization. First order












where mc ≡ MC
PH is the shadow unit cost of production - i.e. the real marginal cost.
30The expected value is taken with respect to the idiosyncratic shock.
13The monopolistic competitive production unit. Each ﬁrm in this sector has monopolistic power
i nt h ep r o d u c t i o no fi t so w nv a r i e t y ,i, and therefore has leverage in setting the price. In so doing










where the parameter θ measures the degree of nominal price rigidity. The higher θ the more sluggish
is the adjustment of nominal prices. In the particular case of θ =0prices are ﬂexible. The problem
of each domestic monopolistic ﬁrm is the one of choosing the sequence {PH,t(i)}
∞
t=0 in order to














t = CH,t + C∗
H,t + Ce
t is world demand for the domestic intermediate variety i.T h eﬁrst
































Notice that the lagrange multiplier mct plays the role of the real marginal cost of production. For
convenience it is also useful to rewrite the above pricing condition in terms of individual producer’s
relative price and inﬂation. Let’s deﬁne e pH ≡
PH(i)
PH as the relative price of domestic variety i and
πH,t ≡
PH,t

























143.4 The Financial Intermediary and Diﬀerences in Financial Systems
The ﬁnancial intermediary collects deposits from resident households and provides loans to resident
ﬁrms, by solving a costly state veriﬁcation problem31. An agency problem between the bank and the
entrepreneur arises because of the impossibility for the intermediary to observe the idiosyncratic
shock, ωj, without paying a ﬁxed monitoring cost. Since both agents involved in the contract
are risk neutral optimality requires that the bank makes zero proﬁt, that the entrepreneur does
not suﬀer losses on average and that there is a unique cut-oﬀ value for the idiosyncratic shock
dividing default from non-default states. The contract is intrinsically incentive compatible since it
is assumed that the entrepreneur pays a ﬁxed repayment in the non-default states -i.e. no incentive
to lie - and the bank gets everything is left in the default states - maximum recovery property.
The characteristic of the ﬁnancial system in each country are deﬁned by three primitive vari-
ables: the variance of investment return, deﬁned by the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic
shocks to the return on capital, ωj, the monitoring cost (cm) that the bank pays in bankruptcy
states and the exit probability of ﬁrms, ς, that determines the amount of aggregate net wealth
available for collateral . The agency problem is solved by assuming that the intermediary chooses
the optimal demand for loans L
j
t - i.e. or equivalently the optimal demand of capital - and the
repayment schedule - i.e. or equivalently the cut-oﬀ value ωj for the default states32 -s oa st o
maximize the expected return of the risk neutral entrepreneur subject to a participation constraint
for the risk neutral intermediary and a participation constraint for the borrower for given values
of Rk
t,Q t. I assume that the idiosyncratic shock ωj is distributed according to F(ωj)33. At time t
ﬁrm j chooses K
j





























31The design of the optimal contract in this open economy framework follows the contracting problem considered
in Gale and Hellwig (1985). The design of the contract in the general equilibrium follows Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (1998) and Cooley and Nam (1998).
32The optimality of the contract is achieved by assuming that the intermediary asks for a ﬁxed repayment schedule
over the non-default states. This implies that the contract is incentive compatible. In addition a maximum recovery
property is required. In the default states the intermediary gets everything is left. For the optimality of these
conditions see Gale and Hellwig (1985). Given those conditions the cut-oﬀ value for default states can replace the
repayment schedule as choice variable in the maximization.









where ωj is value of the shock that divides the random space into default and solvency regions,
Zt is the repayment schedule for loans, cm is the monitoring cost paid by the lender. Equation
(31) is the expected return to the entrepreneur, equation (32) is the participation constraint of the
lender, equation (33) is the participation constraint for the borrower.
Using the ﬁrst order condition one can deﬁne a negative relation between the capital/net worth
























QK is the aggregate leverage ratio and vx is a constant term that captures the cross-sectional
variance of risk premia across Entrepreneurs.







) − 1) (37)
Notice that the borrowing limit depends positively from the amount of collateral, NWt, and
negatively from the size of the external ﬁnance premium.
The net wealth ratio, the cut-oﬀ value, the elasticity of the external ﬁnance premium and
consequently the borrowing limit are functions of the primitive parameters - i.e. the variance of the
distribution function F(ωj), the business failure probability, ς, and the monitoring cost, cm.I nt h e
parametrization the primitive parameters will change across the two countries in order to deﬁne
diﬀerent scenarios in terms of relative ﬁnancial fragility. A solution to the ﬁrst order conditions of
the contract is in Appendix 8.
3.5 The Equilibrium Conditions
I impose market clearing conditions for each variety i and assume that aggregate consumption,
i n v e s t m e n ta n do u t p u ti nb o t hc o u n t r i e sc a nb er e p r e s e n t e dt h r o u g haC E Sa g g r e g a t o r . B ya s -
suming that aggregate output can be approximated by the sum of individuals output at least in a
16neighborhood of the steady state, the following equilibrium conditions on demand must hold for
both country:
Yt = CH,t + C∗
H,t + It + Xt (38)
Y ∗








t Qt−1Kt−1 is the loss in capital due to the payment of the monitoring
cost, cm, under the default state, ω ∈ [0,
−
ω]. The real demand for deposits has to be equal to the




Lt =( QtKt − NWt) (40)
Using (10), the aggregate budget constraint of the entrepreneurs, (14), the relation for the
marginal and the average Tobin’s q, the equilibrium condition on loans and deposits, (40), the zero
proﬁt condition for the intermediary and imposing the exhaustion law it can be shown that total








t−1 = Yt − Ct − Ce




4 The Monetary Policy Rules
To assess the robustness of the link between ﬁnancial diﬀerences and the transmission mechanism I
compare diﬀerent monetary regimes - i.e. independent policies versus ﬁxed exchange rate regimes.
The paper will indeed show that heterogenous cycles are more likely to occur under ﬂoating ex-
change rate regimes than under ﬁxed. Since an increasing number of countries under independent
policies are adopting price stability rules I also compare Taylor rule versus rigid inﬂation targeting.
As it will be shown later the two rules imply similar conclusions in terms of international trans-
mission mechanism but can generate diﬀerent volatilities of real variable mostly for very fragile
countries.
Under independent policies, an active monetary policy sets the short term nominal interest









Pt , and bπ,b e are the weights that the monetary authority puts on the deviation
of inﬂation and exchange rate from the target levels. To get determinacy of the equilibrium the
17parameter on inﬂation will be set equal to 1.534. I identify a regime of pure ﬂoating exchange rate
with a Taylor rule of the form (42) in which be =0 . In this case both countries follow the same
rule.
When one of the two countries sets be =0 .99-i . e . be
1−be →∞- the rule identiﬁes a regime
of ﬁxed exchange rates35. In the limit this rule corresponds to the case in which the monetary
authority sets the interest rate equal to the interest rate of the other country.
To ﬁt the case of large currency areas more closely I will explore the eﬀects, under independent
policies, of rigid inﬂation targeting - i.e. price stability rules. In this case the policy maker applies
an inﬁnite weight on domestic inﬂation setting the nominal interest rate equal to the wicksellian
interest rate. This latter eventually depends on the state of the economy - i.e. exogenous shocks,
capital and net worth- and on the foreign country policy rule. In the limit case the price stability
rule for the home country will then read as:
Rt = f(R∗
t,K t−1,NW t−1,A t) (43)
The foreign country follows the same monetary policy rule. To identify this regimes various
techniques have been proposed36. Here I will get the dynamics of the variables by imposing zero
inﬂation and marginal cost into the model.
5C a l i b r a t i o n
The model is parametrized as followed. The two country are assumed to be symmetric in preferences
and technologies but asymmetric in terms of ﬁnancial conditions. Time is taken to be measured in
quarters.
Preferences. I set the discount factor β =0 .99, so that the annual interest rate is equal to
4 percent. I set the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods η equal to 1.5
as in Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994). The parameter on consumption in the utility function
is set equal to one to generate a log utility. This value is compatible with a steady state trade
balanced growth path. The parameter on labor in the utility is set equal to 3. I let the steady
state balanced growth ratio of exports over GDP to vary between γ =0 .15 and γ =0 .3,t h eﬁrst
value being compatible with data for US and Europe. Finally I assume that the steady state net
asset position is symmetric between the two countries. Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2002)
34See Woodford (2002).
35F o ras i m i l a rs p e c i ﬁcation see Monacelli (1999) and Benigno P. and G. Benigno (2000).
36On one side, Neiss and Nelson (2000) show that price stability rules generate a sequence of zero-inﬂation equilibria
from time zero onward. The resulting level of potential output and potential interest rate can be described as moving
average processes of exogenous shocks. On the other side, Woodford (2000) points out that the monetary rule should
be conditioned on actual predetermined variables as if past equilibria were characterized by sticky price behaviors.
18and consistently with Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002) I set the elasticity of the spread on foreign
bonds to the net asset position equal to 0.000742.
Production. The share of capital in the production functions, α,i se q u a lt o0.3. The quarterly
depreciation rate, δ, is set equal to 0.025. The latter implies an annual depreciation rate of roughly
10%, a value compatible with empirical estimates for the US economy. Following Basu and Fernald
(1997) I set µ =0 .2 for the value added mark-up of prices over marginal cost. This generates a
value for the price elasticity of demand, ε, of 6. The coeﬃcient of the marginal in the Phillips of
the model is given by N
θµ. The steady state solution to the current model generates a value for the
fraction of time allocated to work of N =0 .18. Given the assigned value for µ and consistently
with estimates by Sbordone (1998), I set θ =1 7 .5. The elasticity of the price of capital with respect









], is set equal to 0.5. The latter has been
chosen so as to generate a volatility of investment higher than the volatility of consumption as
observed in the data.
Financial frictions parameters. The asymmetries between the two countries will be build
upon assuming three diﬀerent ﬁnancial scenarios for the foreign country given one particular sce-
nario for the home country. The ﬁnancial frictions scenarios are identiﬁe da c c o r d i n gt ot h r e e
primitive parameters: 1) the corporate risk of ﬁrms, identiﬁed by the variance of the idiosyncratic
shock ωj, 2) the bankruptcy cost for the bank, which gives a measure of the loan losses, cm, 3)
t h es u r v i v a lr a t eo fﬁrms, ς, which is an indicator of whole corporate risk since is describes the
aggregate evolution of the business sector. Of the three primitive parameters the ﬁrst two aﬀect
the contracting problem directly whereas the third aﬀects net wealth directly and the contracting
problem indirectly. The solution of the contract in the steady state will lead to values for: 1) the
elasticity of external ﬁnance premium to collateral, Ψ(•), 2) the steady state leverage ratio, L
NW,
3) the steady state external ﬁnance premium, ψss, 4) the optimal cut-oﬀ value ωj and consequently
the default probability F(ωj). A very fragile system in the foreign country is identiﬁed by a situ-
ation in which either monitoring costs for banks, or perceived ﬁnancial risk and/or exit ratio for
ﬁrms are high. In the solution to the ﬁnancial contract this leads to high values for the elasticity
and the steady state value of the external ﬁnance premium, low leverage, high default probability.
Finally low leverage and high elasticity of external ﬁnance premium to collateral generate tighter
borrowing limits.
For further clariﬁcation ﬁgures 2 to 3 show the eﬀect on the solution to the contract of changes
in the bankruptcy cost while taking as given values for the volatility of idiosyncratic shock and
for the exit probability. Values are on annual basis. As it stands clear when the bankruptcy cost
increases the cut-oﬀ value decreases since banks are less eager to monitor. On the other side, banks
demand higher external ﬁnance premia. As a consequence ﬁrms reduce the leverage.
Figures 4 to 5 show the eﬀect on the solution of the contract of changes in the volatility of
19Table 1: Financial scenarios for primitive parameters.
Primitive parameters Scenario 1 Scenario2 Scenario3
σωj 0.26 0.28 0.28
cm 0.05 0.12 0.3
ς 0.973 0.973 0.973
Table 2: Financial scenarios for ﬁnancial contract parameters in the steady state.
Model parameters Scenario 1 Scenario2 Scenario3
K
NW 2.5 2.1 1.9
ψss 270 320 350
ψ(•) 0.029 0.053 0.08
idiosyncratic shock while maintaining the same bankruptcy cost. When the uncertainty about the
return on investment projects raises banks ask a higher external ﬁnance premium and consequently
ﬁrms reduce their leverage. In order to reduce risk banks decrease the optimal cut-oﬀ value. The
latter produces an increase in the default probability.
Since the survival rate aﬀects the contract only indirectly it does not have signiﬁcant eﬀects
on the ﬁnancial scenarios.
The parametrization strategy37 of the ﬁnancial scenarios used to characterize the dynamic of
the model is based on the following criterion. I set the bankruptcy costs using as reference values
the micro data presented before on loan losses as percentage of bank liabilities. I keep the survival
rate ﬁxed. I then set the volatility of idiosyncratic shock so as to generate steady state values for
the external ﬁnance premium that approximate data values for the diﬀerence between the rate on
Treasury bill and the prime lending - i.e. a value of 300 annual basis points for the US economy -.
The following tables38 1,2, show the parametrization for three possible ﬁnancial scenarios for the
foreign country given the a baseline parametrization for the home country.
Exogenous shocks: I consider an aggregate productivity shocks At that aﬀects the produc-
tion of the economy, Yt = AtK
1−α
t Nα
t , and follows an AR(1), whose persistence is varied between
37The ﬁrst order conditions for the contract are three equations in three variables. One needs to specify the three
primitive parameters to get the three unknowns. There are inﬁnite combinations of these values. Mainly those three
situations can arise. a) Both the monitoring cost and the volatility of the idiosyncratic shocks increase and as a result
the external ﬁnance premium and its elasticity increase. b) Only the monitoring cost increases while the volatility of
the idiosyncratic shock remains ﬁxed or decreases. As a result both the external ﬁnance premium and its elasticity
increase. c) Only the volatility of the idiosyncratic shock increases while the monitoring cost remains ﬁxed. As a
result the external ﬁnance premium and its elasticity increase.
38Values on quarterly basis.
200.8 and 0.9. Secondly, I consider a monetary shock that aﬀects the interest rate and is assumed
with zero persistence. The volatility of the shocks is calibrated consistently with estimates for the
US and the Euro area. Correlations of shocks are calibrated so as to get values of cross-correlations
of output that are close to the ones for industrialized countries39.
The equilibrium of the model is characterized as the solution of the system of expectation
diﬀerence equations of the loglinearized form40. For a solution of the steady state of the model
see Appendix 9. Finally Appendix 10 provides the deﬁnition of the competitive equilibrium and an
outline of the loglinearized version of the model.
6 Asymmetric Shocks with Symmetric Financial Systems
To examine the impact of ﬁnancial diﬀerences the discussion will proceed according to the following
steps. First, I explore the case of two countries with symmetric ﬁnancial systems and asymmetric
shocks. This allows me to clarify the intuition behind the transmission mechanism in the model.
Secondly, I show the main result that business cycle heterogeneity occurs under independent poli-
cies. Third, I perturb the economy with respect to the benchmark case by considering diﬀerent
monetary regimes and diﬀerent degree of openness to completely assess the role of ﬁnancial diﬀer-
ences under alternative set-ups. I will consider productivity and monetary shocks.
In this section I examine the impact of shocks when ﬁnancial frictions are symmetric.
Productivity With Independent Policies. I assume that a 1% positive technology shock hit
the home economy and that both countries follow a Taylor type rule. Figure 3 of Annex 1 shows
impulse responses for this experiment. Domestic output increases, domestic inﬂation decreases
and this induces, via a Taylor rule, a decrease of nominal and real interest rates. The decrease in
cost of the loan increases investment and improves collateral conditions. The consequent reduction
in the external ﬁnance premium exacerbate the boost in investment and asset prices. The foreign
country experiences real and ﬁnancial eﬀects too. Part of the transmission is explained by a demand
eﬀect already present in the previous literature called switching expenditure eﬀect. The decrease
in domestic inﬂation shifts demand in the home country in favor of domestic goods. The decrease
in foreign goods demand reduces foreign inﬂation41. The sole demand eﬀect would generate a
negative correlation of outputs between the two countries. The combination of the switching
expenditure eﬀect and of a conventional ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect produces an indirect ﬁnancial
39Ad i ﬀerent calibration strategy could also be chosen. Another possibility would be to ﬁx the correlations of
shocks and then change the volatilities accordingly so as to generate cross-correlations of output reported in the data.
All the results of the model have been tested under diﬀerent calibration strategies without being aﬀected.
40I apply the solution method developed by Anderson and Moore (1985) which enables us to deal with possibly
singular systems, unlike the Blanchard-Khan (1980).
41The absorption eﬀect, that increases domestic demand due to increase in income, is negligible since in this model
the increase in output is more likely to generate an increase in investment expenditure than an increase in the
consumption of workers.
21spillover that goes from the home to the foreign country. Indeed, given the decrease in foreign
inﬂation, foreign nominal interest rates decrease in response to monetary policy. The decrease in
the nominal interest rate and consequently in the cost of the loan improves ﬁnancial conditions
and generates an increase in investment in the foreign country. The increase in investment also
generates an increase in employment, output and an asset price boom. Again the ﬁnancial boost
is exacerbated by the improvement in collateral conditions and by the fall in the external ﬁnance
premium. Depending on its magnitude the ﬁnancial spillover eﬀect can partly or completely oﬀsets
the negative inﬂuence of the shift in demand. Whenever the two countries have similar ﬁnancial
systems - i.e. similar sensitivity of ﬁnancial variables to shocks - the cross-correlations of output
are positive. The subsequent two remarks follow:
Remark 1 Due to ﬁnancial spillover eﬀect an increase in total factor productivity for one of the
two countries can generate an increase in asset prices for the foreign country.
The new open economy literature does not provide explanation of the link between total
factor productivity shocks in the US and asset prices in Europe. This link is well documented and
examined in other areas of macroeconomics - see Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999). The presence
of the ﬁnancial side in this paper’s open economy model helps to explain this missing link in open
economy models.
Remark 2 Due to the ﬁnancial spillover eﬀect an improvement in the technology opportunities for
the home countries is also beneﬁcial for output, investment and employment in the foreign country.
Table 9 compares cross-correlations of output generated by this model with the ones obtained
in standard models of international business cycle - i.e. see Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1995)
- and with the ones in the data. In Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1995) the ﬂow of capital to
the country with improved investment opportunities generate negative correlations of the three
variables across countries. The present model is able to generate positive correlations of output
under asymmetric shocks and under the assumptions that both countries face similar ﬁnancial
conditions on borrowing.
Monetary Policy Shock With Independent. A decrease in the interest rate reduces the cost of
the loan, improves collateral conditions and boosts investment demand in the home country and
foreign country as before. The only remarkable diﬀerence with respect to the productivity shock
stems from the persistence of the responses. The jump is bigger on impact since the monetary
policy shock directly aﬀects the interest rate. On the other side, the persistence is much lower since
the shock is assumed to have zero autocorrelation. Notice that it would be possible to obtain a
hump shaped response of output and investment by adding delays in “time to plan”.
227 Financial Asymmetries with Identical Policies
We now move to examine the eﬀect of ﬁnancial asymmetries. The experiments will provide an-
swers to the following questions. Do countries show diﬀerential business cycle ﬂuctuations given
diﬀerences in the ﬁnancial system? If so, under which conditions are those diﬀerential responses
more pronounced? By introducing ﬁnancial diversity an additional dimension enriches the model.
Diﬀerent sensitivities of credit availability to collateral produce diﬀerent degrees of business cy-
cle responsiveness. To isolate the eﬀect of asymmetries the following analysis assumes identical
policies.
Before proceeding to analyze the dynamic responses of the model notice the following remark.
Remark 3 A country with higher bankruptcy cost or with higher volatility of idiosyncratic shock
experiences lower long run income and capital levels.




0 cmωdF(ω)RkQK, is higher. Hence this depresses the long run growth of the
country - i.e. see Appendix 10. This is consistent with empirical evidence reported in Rodrik,
Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) who show that institutions are an important determinant - i.e.
more than trade and geography - of income levels across countries.
Productivity and Monetary Policy Shocks with Taylor Rules. If the two countries show diﬀerent
degrees of loan sensitivity to collateral diﬀerential responses occur.
First, consistently with the data business cycle diversity emerges with diﬀerences in volatilities
even under symmetric and correlated shocks. In particular when the foreign country is relatively
more fragile foreign variables are relatively more volatile - i.e. see table 12, 13, 14. This result is
consistent with evidence provided by Mihov (2002) who shows that volatilities of de-trended output
across countries is an increasing function of the leverage ratio.
Since the credit channel accounts for the transmission mechanism of this model business cycle
ﬂuctuations tend to diverge when higher diﬀerences in the ﬁnancial system emerge. Table 10 and
11 show a systematic comparison of cross-country correlations of output, for productivity and
monetary shocks. The home country is set alternatively in scenario 1 and in scenario 2. Cross-
correlations decrease whenever the ﬁnancial distance increases. The negative relation between
output correlations and ﬁnancial distance is of the same magnitude of the one observed in the data-
i.e. see ﬁgure 1 of Annex 1. Figure 2 of Annex 1 also shows that this relation is independent from
the correlations of the underlying shocks. Cross-correlations of output increase when increasing
the correlation of productivity shocks. But for any given level of the latter they decrease when the
ﬁnancial distance increases.
Remark 4 The correlation among the business cycles of two countries is a decreasing function of
t h ed e g r e eo fﬁnancial diversity.
23Trade Openness. A higher degree of openness increases the correlations of cycles (see table 10
to 11). The intuition of this result is as follows. The magnitude of the switching expenditure eﬀect
for each unit of consumption is not aﬀected by changes in economic openness since the elasticity
between home and foreign goods is the same. On the other side the magnitude of the ﬁnancial
spillover eﬀect is bigger. For instance, under a positive technology shock to the home country
higher economic openness leads to a higher fall in exports and a higher decrease in inﬂation for the
foreign country. The higher decrease in inﬂation generates a higher decrease in interest rates and
a higher increase in investment and output for the foreign country.
Remark 5 A higher degree of trade openness increases the correlation of cycles.
Financial Openness. To test if asymmetries in business cycle persist with increasing ﬁnancial
market globalization I also assess the role of the ﬁnancial exposure. In this case I allow for a fraction
of loans to be supplied by foreign intermediaries and as such denominated in foreign currency -
i.e. see also Faia and Monacelli (2000). An increase in the ﬁnancial openness - i.e. a positive
fraction of loans denominated in foreign currency - enhances the diﬀerential responses of home
variables due to the additional eﬀect that changes in the exchange rate have on the cost of the
loan. To the extent that home loans are denominated in foreign currency any shock that produces
a collapse in the exchange rates moves wealth from domestic borrowers to foreign lenders, and
viceversa with an increase in the exchange rates. In addition exchange rates are more persistent
and volatile when ﬁnancial diﬀerences increase. As a consequence the wealth shift is higher when
the ﬁnancial distance increases thereby leading to more pronounced business cycle asymmetries.
This is consistent with empirical results from Heathcote and Perri (2002b) who show that ﬁnancial
globalization leads to more asymmetric cycles.
Remark 6 Ah i g h e rd e g r e eo fﬁnancial openness leads to higher asymmetries in business cycle
ﬂuctuations across the two countries.
Productivity and Monetary Policy Shocks with Rigid Inﬂation Targeting Rules. Table 12, 13,
14 show volatilities for home and foreign variables under the three regimes considered - i.e. Taylor
rule, rigid inﬂation targeting and credible pegs. Under a regime of strict inﬂation targeting the
volatilities of both real and ﬁnancial variables increase. As in Gali’ and Monacelli (2000) and
Monacelli (2000) output does seem to respond more under this rule. With zero inﬂation the
nominal interest rate is set on a period by period basis equal to the wicksellian interest rate that
reacts to shocks, capital and net worth of ﬁrms. The reaction of the nominal interest rate to net
worth spreads the ﬁnancial instability to the all economy.
Remark 7 A rigid inﬂation targeting rule increases volatility of both, ﬁnancial and real variables.
24Productivity and Monetary Policy Shocks with Credible Pegs. Under credible pegs business
cycle correlations across countries tend to be more positive than under independent policies. Since
the foreign interest rate is set equal to the domestic interest rate the impact of ﬁnancial diﬀerences
is mitigated and cycles are more synchronized - see table 15. This happens for two reasons. First,
when the nominal exchange rate channel is shut-oﬀ the switching expenditure eﬀect is mitigated.
Hence output correlations move toward more positive values. Indeed, under a positive technology
shock to the home country, real depreciations occur only to the extent that sticky prices generate
diﬀerences in price dynamics. Secondly, since the foreign monetary authority sets the interest rate
equal to the one of the domestic economy the eﬀect of shocks on ﬁnancial variables tends to be
similar.
Remark 8 Synchronization among cycles increases under credible pegs.
8C o n c l u s i o n
The focus of this paper is on the role that ﬁnancial market asymmetries play in the international
transmission of shocks. Although ﬁnancial asymmetries are systematically invoked to explain dif-
ferences in the domestic transmission of monetary policy or other shocks, they have so far not been
used in the analysis of international interdependence.
The ﬁrst step in this paper is to show some stylized facts concerning international correlation
of business cycles and ﬁnancial asymmetries. I ﬁnd that there is a link between them. Across a
sample of OECD countries, there is a signiﬁcant negative association between correlation of cycles
and the diﬀerences in ﬁnancial structures and/or in the degree of ﬁnancial risk. This link is robust
to the inclusion of third factors like bilateral trade integration and geography.
As a second step, I build a two-country stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model with
optimizing agents characterized by nominal rigidities, imperfect ﬁnancial integration, borrowing
constraints on investment and ﬁnancial diversity in terms of fragility of banking systems and risk-
iness of investment projects. The model is calibrated for the US and the euro area and analyzed
under productivity and monetary policy shocks.
Business cycle asymmetries across countries are linked to ﬁnancial diﬀerences. Several facts
concerning the international transmission mechanism are well explained by the model. Hence the
analysis shows the ability of a set-up that links the trade and the ﬁnancial side of the economy and
that integrates the domestic and the international transmission mechanism.
Although the analysis of this paper is referred to the US and the euro area, the basic ideas have,
I believe, more general validity. The model could be directly applied to examine, for example, issues
related to the international impact of Japan’s ﬁnancial fragility, or the macroeconomic interaction
between ﬁnancially asymmetric countries linked by a hard peg (e.g. a currency board) or belonging
25to currency unions.
In addition, the mechanism considered in this set-up has a potential for accounting of additional
international business cycle facts, like the exchange rate persistence and volatility puzzle. In fact,
diﬀerences in ﬁnancial fragility generate diﬀerences in volatility and persistence of the real interest
rate. Those diﬀerences are absorbed by the real exchange rate through the uncovered interest
parity. All this is left for future research.
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29Appendix
9 Solution of the Contract in The Steady State
The ﬁrst order conditions to the maximization problem of the intermediary are derived here. Let
us deﬁne kj = Kj
Lj where and ψ = Rk
R . Let us rearrange the constraints of the maximization
problem using the fact that the last three constraints hold with strict equality. We can then
substitute equations (33) and (34) in (31) and in (32). After rearranging the constraints and using
L e i b n i zr u l et od i ﬀerentiate the integral function with respect to ωj we get the following ﬁrst order










ωjdF(ωj)]}(κ)− χ =0 (44)
[1 − F(ωj)]− χ[(1− F(ωj)) − cmF0(ωj]=0 (45)





ωjdF(ωj)}(ψkj)=[ kj − 1] (46)
There is a one to one relation between the capital/net worth ratio (kj) and the ratio between
t h er i s kf r e ei n t e r e s tr a t ea n dt h ec o s to fl o a n( ψ that is the external ﬁnance premium) and this
relation is negative. Assuming an interior solution for ωj42 and using equation (45), we can derive
χ as an increasing function of ωj. By substituting χ(ωj) in (44) one can derive a one to one relation
between the external ﬁnance premium and ωj, ψ = f(ωj). By substituting ωj = f−1(ψ) in (46)
one can derive a one to one relation of the form kj = Ψ−1(ψ). Inverting the last relation and













with Ψ0 < 0. The negative sign of Ψ0 c a nb ep r o v e db ys i m p l ys u b s t i t u t i n gωj = f−1(ψ) into
the (46) and taking derivative of kj with respect to ψ.
42The existence of an interior solution can be proved by either of the two following arguments. First, when choosing
a speciﬁc distribution - e.g. a normal distribution - for F(ω
j) it is possible to show that a value of ω
j =0does not
satisﬁes all the three FOC together. Alternatively, one can notice that for the set of points for which the constraint
is satisﬁed with equality the gradient of the objective function is parallel to the gradient of the constraint. This is a
necessary and suﬃcient condition for an interior solution.
30The set of ﬁrst order conditions represents a systems of three equation in three variables. The
distribution for the idiosyncratic shock is assumed lognormal with unitary mean so that it can be
pinned down simply by choosing the standard deviation. After choosing the values for the variance
of F(ωj) and the monitoring cost , one can get values for the steady state external ﬁnance premium,
its elasticity to collateral over the cycle and the steady state net wealth/capital ratio.
10 The Steady State of the Economy
Let us characterize the perfect foresight steady state of the two country economy. When ﬁnancial
systems are symmetric we can assume Y = Y ∗ and derive the same steady state ratios for both
economies. When countries face diﬀerent monitoring costs and variances of idiosyncratic shock,
t h em a g n i t u d eo fX =
R −
ω
0 cmωdF(ω)RkQK is also diﬀerent. In particular when the home country
is less ﬁnancially fragile than the foreign country X<X ∗. Hence from the resource constraint we
know that:
Y> Y ∗
For both countries we can set A =1 . Markups are constant in the steady state, implying a marginal
cost mc = 1
µ. F r o mt h eE u l e ri ns t e a d ys t a t ew eg e tR = 1




K, the return on capital in steady state is Rk = 1
µαY
K +( 1− δ)=R + ψss,where






When the foreign country is facing higher monitoring costs and higher volatility of idiosyncratic
shocks, ψ∗
ss > ψss,R ∗k >R k and Y> Y ∗. As a consequence:
K>K ∗
The law of motion for capital accumulation in the steady state is given by K = K(1−δ)+φ( I
K)K
and I
K = δ. Using the last ratio we get that I
Y = δα
µ(Rk−1+δ). Using the Cobb-Douglas production
function and the Y














31where σ and τ are the coeﬃcient on utility for consumption and labor. To obtain exports
and imports function consider a steady state where the initial wealth distribution is normalized so
that eR =1and the terms of trade tot =1 . This implies that in a balance growth path trade










Y . Using this equality and the resource constraint in steady state we ﬁnd






















In the loglinearized version of the resource constraint ζh = CH
Y , ζh∗ =
CH∗
Y ,ζIh = K
Y ,ζce = Ce
Y .I t
is assumed that Ce
Y is a small fraction of total consumption.
11 The Competitive Allocation and The Loglinearized Version of
the Model
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium for the economy described is:
a) A collection of allocations {Ct(i),C H,t,C F,t,N t}∞
t=0 and assets {B∗
t ,D t}∞
t=0 for home work-






t=0 and assets {B∗
t ,D ∗
t}∞
t=0 for foreign workers, and an aggregate con-
sumption function for home entrepreneurs {Ce
t}∞
t=0 and for foreign entrepreneurs {C∗e
t }∞
t=0;
b) Allocation and prices for domestic goods {YH,t,P H,t}∞
t=0 and for labor and investment de-
mands in the home country {Nt,I t}∞
t=0; allocation and prices for foreign goods {YF,t,P F,t}∞
t=0 and




c) aggregate price levels {Pt,P∗
t }∞
t=0,a s s e tr e t u r n s{Rt,R ∗
t,R F
t }∞
t=0, prices of capital {Qt,Q ∗
t}∞
t=0;
d) predetermined variables {Kt,NW t,K∗
t ,NW∗
t }∞
t=0,equilibrium exchange rate {et}∞
t=0,a n d
individual transfers and taxes that satisfy the following conditions:
(i) taking as given prices, workers allocation solve workers’ maximization, (ii) entrepreneurs’
optimization problem, (iii) each diﬀerentiated good producer chooses the price optimally, (iv) input
demands solve maximization problem of competitive ﬁrms, (vi), given transfer government budget
is in balance, (vii) markets clear.
What follows is a list of the complete loglinearized model for the home country. Similarly the
relations apply to the foreign country.
• Aggregate Demand.
b yt =( ζh − ζh∗)(η(1 − γ)
∧
tott)+ζhb ct + ζh∗b c∗





































































































































































• ζh =( 1− γ)[1 − δα
µ(Rk−1+δ) − Ce




















], δ = Φ( I
K)= I
K;
• λ = Nθ
µ ;
• a1 =[ ςRk K
NW − ςψ K
NW + ςψ],a 2 =[ ςβ−1( K
NW − 1) + ςψ K
NW − ςψ],a 3 =[ ςRk K




• a4 =[ ςRk K
NW − ςβ−1 K
NW − ςψ K
NW],a 5 =[ ςβ−1 + ςψ],a 6 =( 1− ξ)ςβ−1( K
NW − 1).
• b1 = B
Y ,b 2 = C
Y ,b 3 = Ce
Y ,b 4 = I
Y .
Equation (48) is obtained by substituting in the loglinearized version of the resource constraint
the demand for domestic and foreign consumption good. Equation (49) is the loglinear Euler
equation after substituting the expression for the CPI domestic inﬂation. Equation (50) gives
entrepreneurial consumption. Equation (51) is the loglinear external ﬁnance premium. Equation
(52) is the loglinear expected return on capital. Equation (53) is the loglinear Tobin’s q. Equation
(54) is the loglinear UIP expressed in real terms. Equation (55) is the loglinear production function
of the competitive sector. Equation (56) is obtained by loglinearizing the equilibrium condition for
the labor market. Equation (57) is the Phillips curve. Finally equations (58), (59), (60) give law of
motion of predetermined variables. In addition the model contains loglinear function for exports
and imports demands. For the foreign country we have the same set of equations.
34Table 3: Summary of ﬁnancial statistics for major industrialized areas.
Data Euro Area US UK Japan
Population 292.2 272.9 58.7 126.5
Share of World GDP 18.8 21.9 7.6 3.2
Corporate Debt Security 7.4 31.2 18.4 11
Table 4: Bank industry health and importance of external ﬁnance.
Data Return on Assets Loan loss External Finance Thomson Rating
EMU countries
Austria 0.38 0.59 46 2.38
Belgium 0.52 0.17 60 2
Finland 0.50 0.78 34 2.83
France 0.36 0.24 49 2.28
Germany 0.44 0.18 58 1.97
Greece 1.11 0.18 3 2.50
Ireland 1.57 0.17 13 1.83
Italy 0.33 0.62 37 2.57
Netherlands 0.75 0.26 48 2.10
Portugal 0.91 0.42 19 2.30
Spain 0.76 0.32 11 1.79
Euro area 0.50 0.32 40.76 2.16
UK 1.28 0.18 45 2.04
US 1.42 0.10 64 1.73
Japan 0.01 0.75 39 3.32
35Table 5: Emprical Cross-Correlations of Output Gaps.




France -0.10 0.05 0.72
Italy -0.28 0.38 0.75 0.74
United Kingdom 0.68 -0.36 -0.38 -0.14 0.15
































Figure 1: Relation between cross-correlation of output and ﬁnancial diﬀerences.
36Table 6: Regression of correlation of output over ﬁnancial gap.
Dep var: Corr of output gap Coef St Dev t-stat Prob
Constant 0.55 0.09 5.26 0.0000
Financial Gap -0.37 0.18 -2.07 0.044
Table 7: Regression of correlation of output over ﬁnancial gap and trade.
D e pv a r :C o r ro fo u t p u tg a p C o e f S tD e v t - s t a t P r o b
Constant 0.55 0.098 5.62 0.0000
Financial Gap -0.37 0.18 -2.047 0.046
Trade -0.0.2 0.010 -0.19 0.044
Table 8: Regression of correlation of output over ﬁnancial gap, trade and a dummy for
language.
Dep var: Corr of output gap Coef St Dev t-stat Prob
Constant 1.02 0.28 3.67 0.0007
Financial Gap -0.30 0.18 -1.61 0.11
Trade -0.05 0.01 -0.57 0.56
Language Dummy -0.0.9 0.05 -1.79 0.08
Table 9: Cross-correlation of output. Home productivity shocks.
Corr(y,y∗) BKK Symmetric Financial Systems Data
Home Productivity Shock -0.28 0.44 Median∗ U.S./Europe∗∗
Two Correlated Shocks 0.02 0.57 0.29 0.66
∗Baxter and Farr (2002).







































































































































Figure 5: Eﬀects of changing volatility of idiosyncratic shock on default probability and
optimal cut-oﬀ value.
39Table 10: Cross-correlation of output. Symmetric and correlated productivity shocks.
Symmetric and Correlated Productivity Shocks Scenario 1 Scenario2 Scenario3
Home country in scenario 1, γ =0 .15 0.49 0.44 0.34
Home country in scenario 1, γ =0 .2 0.51 0.48 0.37
Home country in scenario 1, γ =0 .3 0.50 0.45 0.34
Home country in scenario 2, γ =0 .15 0.44 0.59 0.57
Home country in scenario 2, γ =0 .2 0.46 0.62 0.62
Home country in scenario 2, γ =0 .3 0.47 0.63 0.62
Table 11: Cross-correlation of output. Symmetric and correlated monetary shocks.
Symmetric and Correlated Monetary Shocks Scenario 1 Scenario2 Scenario3
Home country in scenario 1, γ =0 .15 0.61 0.55 0.56
Home country in scenario 1, γ =0 .2 0.64 0.58 0.49
Home country in scenario 1, γ =0 .3 0.68 0.63 0.56
Home country in scenario 2, γ =0 .15 0.61 0.91 0.89
Home country in scenario 2, γ =0 .2 0.65 0.85 0.83
Home country in scenario 2, γ =0 .3 0.71 0.91 0.88
Table 12: Second moments for domestic and foreign variables with Taylor rules. Cor-
related productivity shock.
Second Moments - Taylor rule Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario3
Domestic Output σ2
y 1.78 1.78 1.78
Domestic Investment σ2
I 2.05 2.05 2.06
Domestic Price of Capital σ2
q 0.89 0.89 0.89
Foreign Output σ2
y∗ 1.78 1.84 1.85
Foreign Investment σ2
I∗ 2.05 2.48 2.53
Foreign Output σ2
q∗ 0.89 1.10 1.13
40Table 13: Second moments for domestic and foreign variables with Inﬂation Targeting.
Correlated productivity shock.
Second Moments - Inﬂation Targeting Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario3
Domestic Output σ2
y 1.89 1.89 1.89
Domestic Investment σ2
I 2.26 2.26 2.27
Domestic Price of Capital σ2
q 0.98 0.98 0.98
Foreign Output σ2
y∗ 1.89 1.96 1.97
Foreign Investment σ2
I∗ 2.26 2.77 2.85
Foreign Output σ2
q∗ 0.98 1.22 1.27
Table 14: Second moments for domestic and foreign variables with Credible Pegs. Cor-
related productivity shock.
Second Moments - Credible Pegs Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario3
Domestic Output σ2
y 1.63 1.63 1.63
Domestic Investment σ2
I 2.03 2.02 2.03
Domestic Price of Capital σ2
q 0.88 0.88 0.88
Foreign Output σ2
y∗ 1.78 1.85 1.84
Foreign Investment σ2
I∗ 2.15 2.64 2.70
Foreign Output σ2
q∗ 0.94 1.17 1.22
Table 15: Comparison of cross-correlations for productivity shocks under Taylor Rules
and Credible Pegs. Home country in scenario 2.
Rule Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario3
Taylor Rule 0.49 0.44 0.31








































































Figure 2: Eﬀects on cross-correlations of output of changing ﬁnancial gap and correla-
tion of shocks.
3Figure 3: Impulse responses of domestic and foreign variables to home productivity
shocks.
4